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Abstract
This paper re-examines the optimal tax design problem (income and commodities)
in the presence of externalities. The nature of the second-best, and the choice of the
tax instruments, are motivated by the informational structure in the economy. The
main results are: (i) environmental levies must generally consist of Pigouvian and non-
Pigouvian terms and be nonlinear; (ii) externalities do not affect commodity tax formu-
las (linear and nonlinear) for private goods; (iii) externalities do not affect the income
tax structure if commodity taxes are nonlinear and affect it if commodity taxes are lin-
ear; and (iv) a general income tax plus strictly Pigouvian taxes are sufficient for efficient
taxation if individuals of different types have identical marginal rates of substitution
(at any given consumption bundle).
JEL classification: H21; H23
Keywords: optimal taxation; externalities; environmental levies; second-best; informa-
tional structure
1 Introduction
The role of public policy in combating environmental problems is a hotly debated issue
among economists and non-economists alike. The only consensus in academic circles
is that if there is to be public intervention, it should be incentive-based rather than
command and control. The most fully-developed incentive approach is the Pigouvian
tax scheme. The idea is to levy a tax on an externality generating activity equal
to its marginal social damage. This is a first-best remedy which, in the absence of
other distortions in the economy (including distortionary taxes), moves the competitive
equilibrium of the economy to its Pareto-efficient frontier. In a second-best environment,
however, this prescription must be modified.
This problem was originally studied by Sandmo (1975), and more recently by Boven-
berg and van der Ploeg (1994).1The main result that has emerged from this literature is
what Sandmo dubbed the “additivity property” where the presence of externality only
alters the tax formula for the externality generating good, leaving the tax formulas for
other goods unaffected. Dixit (1985) has referred to Sandmo’s result as an instance
of the more general “principle of targeting”. The idea is that one should best counter
a distortion by the tax instrument that acts on it directly. Bovenberg and van der
Ploeg (1994) also emphasize this principle in their finding that the formula for the labor
income tax must also remain unaffected.
While this literature has been motivated by the recognition that second-best consid-
erations may alter the characterization of optimal taxes, its treatment of the second-best
has been quite arbitrary. In particular, it has assumed that the feasible tax instruments,
including the income tax, are all linear. This is important. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)
have taught us that the properties of optimal tax schemes depend crucially on the instru-
1Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) examine a number of other issues including the impact of
externalities on employment as well as on the optimal level and composition of public spending. These
latter issues are not the concern of this paper. Nor are we concerned with the taxation of intermediate
inputs as in Bovenberg and Goulder (1996).
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ments allowed. The aim of the current paper is to re-examine the optimal tax problem
in the presence of externalities while motivating the choice of the tax instruments by
the informational structure in the economy.
We pose two basic questions. The first question concerns the nature of the optimal
tax on an externality generating good when first-best taxes are not available. Under
what circumstances does the tax differ from the Pigouvian tax? What factors determine
the sign and the magnitude of this difference? The second question inquires into the
properties of second-best taxes on “private” good and income in the presence of exter-
nalities. In particular, what are the interconnections between environmental levies and
traditional tax instruments? The answers to these questions crucially depend on the
delineation of the second-best itself; namely the extent and the nature of the constraints
that prevent imposition of first-best taxes. We will consider two such specifications in
this paper based on the informational constraints the government faces.
We model an economy with n private goods, labor supply and an externality gener-
ating good. The externality is created by the total consumption of the good in question.
Many environmental problems are due to this type of externality; greenhouse effect is
an example.2 There are H types of persons in the economy who may differ in two di-
mensions: earning abilities and tastes. This is a generalization of Stiglitz’s (1982, 1987)
two-group optimal tax model when individuals differ only in earning abilities. In the
tradition of the optimal tax literature, we assume that the types are not publicly ob-
servable. This makes first-best tax instruments unavailable. However, personal income
levels are observable so that non-linear income taxation is feasible.
In the first part of the paper (Section 3), we follow the implicit assumption of
Stiglitz that personal consumption levels are publicly observable. This assumption
allows commodity taxes to be levied in a non-linear fashion. We then characterize the
properties of second-best taxes in this environment. Answering our first question, we
2Meade (1952) has termed such externalities “atmosphere” externalities. For the issues pertaining
to greenhouse effect and global warming, see Dornbusch and Poterba (1991).
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show that the tax on the externality generating good is non-linear, with a formula that
contains both Pigouvian and non-Pigouvian elements. Recall that the first-best tax
is linear with an identical rate for everybody; it is also strictly Pigouvian in nature.
Answering our second question, we show that the presence of the externality does not
affect the formulas determining the optimal commodity taxes on private goods and
income taxes. This finding is in agreement with Sandmo’s additivity property.
We next extend Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) famous result [and Mirrlees’s (1976)
generalization of it] on the usefulness of commodity taxes in the presence of a general
income tax, to a setting with externality. We prove that when individuals of different
types have identical marginal rates of substitution (at any given consumption bundle),
differential commodity taxation is not called for and the optimal tax on the externality
generating good is strictly Pigouvian. Moreover, for a two-group case, we find conditions
under which the externality tax must be greater or smaller than the Pigouvian tax.
In the second part of the paper (Sections 4—6), we drop the assumption of public
observability of personal consumption levels and examine the optimal tax problem anew.
This is motivated by the nature of information typically available to tax administrations.
While total purchases of a commodity are generally observed, individual consumption
levels are often private information. As a rule, the tax administration does not know
the identity of who buys how much of what good. Lack of public observability of
personal purchases precludes the levying of non-linear commodity taxes. The best that
the government can do is to impose (possibly differential) linear commodity taxes.
Given this informational structure, we characterize Pareto-efficient allocations that
are constrained, in addition to resource balance and the standard self-selection con-
straints, by the linearity of commodity taxes. To do this, we derive an optimal revelation
mechanism. For our purpose, a mechanism consists of a set of type-specific before-tax
and after-tax incomes and a vector of commodity tax rates (same for everyone). This
procedure determines the commodity tax rates right from the outset. A complete solu-
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tion to the optimal tax problem per-se then requires only the design of an implementing
income tax function.
We give a characterization for optimal commodity taxes and examine the properties
of the marginal income tax rate. Answering our first question anew, we show that
the optimal externality tax continues to consist of both Pigouvian and non-Pigouvian
elements. Regarding our second question, we show that while the tax formulas for
private goods remain unaffected, the structure of income taxation changes. That is, the
presence of externality has different implications for commodity and income taxation.
This indicates that Sandmo’s additivity property, and Dixit’s Principle of targeting,
is not a universal property. It depends on the nature of the tax instruments that are
available (i.e. if linear or nonlinear) for direct as against indirect intervention.
Independently from the externality issue, the paper also makes a methodological
contribution to the optimal tax literature. Building on Cremer et al. (1996), it studies
Pareto-efficient tax structures in a model with H types of individuals and two un-
observable characteristics. It derives general results on the properties of income and
commodity taxes for two informational structures: public observability of consumption
levels at (i) personal and (ii) aggregate levels.
2 The model
Consider an economy consisting of a continuum of individuals who can be grouped into
H different and finite types. The types may differ in two characteristics: earning abilities
and tastes. Each person, regardless of his type, is endowed with one unit of time. He
has preferences over labor supply and n+1 consumer goods. All goods are produced by
a linear technology subject to constant returns to scale. The (n + 1)th good creates a
negative consumption externality; the first n goods (labelled private goods) do not. The
externality is created by the total consumption of y. This is the type Meade (1952) has
termed “atmosphere” externalities. Normalize the population size at one and denote
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the proportion of persons of type j in the population by πj . Further denote the vector
of private goods by x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), the externality generating good by y, the labor
supply by L, and normalize producer prices of all consumer goods at one.
A person of type j has wj as his wage and
0j = U(x, y, L, θj)− φ
³ HX
j=1
πjyj
´
, j = 1, 2, . . . ,H, (1)
as his utility function, where θj is a “taste” parameter. Note that while type j differs
from type k (k 6= j), it is possible that wj = wk or θj = θk. In words, we do not rule out
the case where two types differ in one of the characteristics only. This is a very general
specification assuming no particular correlation between the values of θj and wj .3
We assume thatU is strictly quasi-concave, twice continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing in x and y, and strictly decreasing in L; while φ is convex and increasing. The
following points must be noted regarding the specification of preferences in (1). First,
For the purpose of exposition, we shall take the externality to be detrimental. Thus
φ(.) appears in (1) with a negative sign. Second, the seemingly equal weight assigned
to φ(.) is only in appearance; it imposes no restrictions. Since U depends on θj , this
is a matter of normalization.4Third, allowing φ(.) to also depend on θj will entail only
a slight modification in the expressions derived below; it is of no consequence. Fourth,
the main assumption is that of separability of preferences between consumption goods
and the externality. This is adopted for ease of exposition; it does not change the main
conclusions of the paper.
In the tradition of the optimal income tax literature, we assume that an individual’s
type and labor input is not observable by the government. His before-tax income,
I = wL, on the other hand, is. This rules out first-best taxation of types as a policy
3Specifically, θj and wj take M(≤ H) and N(≤ H) distinct values, resulting in H(≤M.N) different
types in the economy.
4For any non-unitary weight on φ(.), one can divide 0j by that weight and return to the specification
in (1).
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instrument while allowing non-linear taxation of incomes. It is then convenient to
introduce a type-specific utility function describing preferences over xi’s, y and I:
uj(x, y, I) ≡ U
³
x, y,
I
wj
, θj
´
, (2)
where wj is the wage of an individual of type j.
Given this framework, we set out to answer the two basic questions we posed in the
Introduction. To do this, we specify two informational structures for the government;
each delineating a different second-best environment.
3 Observable individual purchases
Suppose that in addition to before-tax incomes, Ij ’s, the government could also observe
individual purchases, xji ’s and y
j ’s, so that nonlinear commodity taxes are feasible. Tax
structures will then be constrained by self-selection only. This is the framework used by
Stiglitz (1982, 1987) to discuss Pareto-efficient self-selection tax structures. Of course,
in his set-up, there is no externality. Moreover, he does not allow for taste differentiation
and considers only two groups of persons who differ in earning abilities.
To derive the tax structure, we consider the standard equivalent problem of the
government first choosing optimal allocations subject to resource balance, self-selection
and the relevant non-negativity constraints. Having derived the optimal allocation, we
then describe the tax structure that can implement it.
3.1 Pareto-efficient allocations
Let R¯ denote the government’s revenue requirement. Denote the utility level of a j-type
individual by uj when he chooses the allocation intended for him, and by ujk when he
chooses a k-type person’s bundle. Thus denote
uj = uj(xj , yj , Ij), (3a)
ujk = uj(xk, yk, Ik). (3b)
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One can then describe the set of Pareto-efficient allocations as follows. Maximize
HX
j=1
γj0j , (4)
with respect to xj , yj and Ij ; subject to the resource constraint
HX
j=1
πj
³
Ij −
X
i
xji − yj
´
≥ R¯, (5)
and the self-selection constraints
uj ≥ ujk, j 6= k; j, k = 1, 2, . . . ,H, (6)
where γj ’s are positive constants with the normalization
PH
j=1 γ
j = 1.
Denote the Lagrangian expression by L, and the (non-negative) Lagrangian mul-
tipliers associated with the resource constraint (5) by μ, and with the self-selection
constraints (6) by λjk. One can write5
L =
X
j
γj0j + μ
hX
j
πj(Ij −
X
i
xji − yj)− R¯
i
+
X
j
X
k 6=j
λjk(uj − ujk). (7)
Substitute for 0j from (1) into (7), use
P
j γ
j = 1 and rearrange the terms to rewrite
the Lagrangian expression as
L =
X
j
³
γj +
X
k 6=j
λjk
´
uj − φ
³X
j
πjyj
´
+ μ
hX
j
πj(Ij −
X
i
xji − yj)− R¯
i
−
X
j
X
k 6=j
λjkujk. (8)
This yields the following first-order conditions for j = 1, 2, . . . ,H, and i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
∂L
∂xji
= (γj +
X
k 6=j
λjk)uji − μπj −
X
k 6=j
λkjukji = 0, (9a)
5To simplify notation, we use
P
j for
PH
j=1 and
P
k 6=j for
PH
k=1
k 6=j
throughout the paper.
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∂L
∂yj
= (γj +
X
k 6=j
λjk)ujy − πjφ0 − μπj −
X
k 6=j
λkjukjy = 0, (9b)
∂L
∂Ij
= (γj +
X
k 6=j
λjk)ujI + μπ
j −
X
k 6=j
λkjukjI = 0, (9c)
where a subscript on u denotes a partial derivative. Note that the calculation of the
derivatives of
P
j
P
k 6=j λjkujk results in the transposition of their j and k indices. Ma-
nipulating first-order conditions (9a)—(9c), one can derive the following equations for
j = 1, 2, . . . ,H, and i, s = 1, 2, . . . , n.
ujy
uji
=
1 + φ0/μ+
P
k 6=j λkjukjy /μπj
1 +
P
k 6=j λkju
kj
i /μπj
, (10a)
ujs
uji
=
1 +
P
k 6=j λkjukjs /μπj
1 +
P
k 6=j λkju
kj
i /μπj
, (10b)
−u
j
I
uji
=
1−Pk 6=j λkjukjI /μπj
1 +
P
k 6=j λkju
kj
i /μπj
. (10c)
The system of equations (10a)—(10c) characterizes Pareto-efficient allocations constrained
by self-selection. Note that these conditions, and our specification, are quite general. In
particular, they are not based on the “single-crossing” property. The self-selection con-
straints associated with a j-type mimicking a k-type and a k-type mimicking a j-type
can simultaneously bind; and one can also have “bunching”.
The left-hand sides of (10a)—(10c) are the familiar marginal rates of substitution
between different goods.6When individuals do their purchases in the market, they set
these rates equal to the relative prices they face. This observation allows us to examine
the properties of the tax function which can implement these allocations.
6That ujy/u
j
i is the relevant marginal rate of substitution follows because, when optimizing with
respect to yj , a j-type person treats
P
j π
jyj as given. This is due to the continuum of individuals
set-up of the paper. As far as −ujI/u
j
i is concerned, one may think of it as a j-type person’s marginal
rate of substitution between the gross of tax income and good i, as well as (1/wj) times his marginal
rate of substitution between leisure and good i.
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3.2 First-best taxation
It will be instructive to start by examining the nature of first-best taxes. Our char-
acterization of the second-best above allows us to do this most simply. At first-best
allocations, self-selection is not a constraint on the government’s problem. Thus set
λkj = 0 in equations (10a)—(10c). This yields
ujy
uji
= 1 +
φ0
μ
, (11a)
ujs
uji
= 1, (11b)
−u
j
I
uji
= 1. (11c)
Equations (11a)—(11c) tell us that the implementation of first-best outcome requires, as
expected, no distortionary taxes on xji ’s and I
j but a tax on yj (j = 1, 2, . . . ,H) equal
to φ0/μ. Note that the required tax rate on y is the same for everyone and equal to the
marginal social damage associated with any person’s purchase of a last unit of y. This
is the case because the nature of the externality is such that only aggregate size of y
(=
P
j πjyj) matters.
In what follows, for concreteness, we shall follow the following terminology.
Definition 1 A tax is called (i) Pigouvian if it is equal to φ0/μ (the marginal social
damage of
P
j π
jyj) and (ii) non-Pigouvian if φ0/μ does not appear in the expressions
that determine it.
3.3 Second-best taxation
When at least one of the self-selection constraints in (6) is binding, the optimal allocation
is no longer first-best. The allocations to be implemented are thus characterized by
(10a)—(10c) [rather than by (11a)—(11c)]. Consider (10a); the equation characterizing
the second-best tax on y. It shows that any groups of persons, l, for whom λkl 6= 0, for
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some k, must pay a tax on y which will generally be different from φ0/μ. In a sense, this
is to be expected. Our setting also requires that the tax treatment of private goods to
depart from first-best (i.e. they should be taxed rather than go tax free). It is thus only
logical that the same principle should hold for the tax treatment of non-private goods.
One can nevertheless make three important observations regarding the tax treatment
of y. First, the formula characterizing the marginal tax on y contains Pigouvian and
non-Pigouvian terms. Second, the non-Pigouvian term is the same as in the formula
for the optimal tax on private goods. That is, the formulas for taxation of private
and non-private goods differ only in that the latter entails a Pigouvian term. Third,
as will be shown below, unless one places certain restrictions on preferences, different
types of persons face different marginal tax rates on y depending on which self-selection
constraints bind. Put another way, the optimal tax on y is non-linear. Contrast these
with first-best taxes where everyone, regardless of his type, faces a constant marginal
tax rate equal to φ0/μ. While there may be some types of persons who would pay the
Pigouvian tax here, this will not be the case for all types.7
Next, turn to (10b)—(10c), the equations characterizing optimal taxes on private
goods and income. These equations do not contain any externality terms; they are
identical to the equations governing optimal second-best taxes in the absence of the
externality. In this sense, one may say that the presence of the externality does not
change the structure of second-best taxes on private goods and income.8
This last result was originally derived by Sandmo (1975) in a setting with propor-
tional income and commodity taxes. He dubbed it the “additivity property” whereby
“the marginal social damage of commoditym enters the tax formula for that commodity
additively, and does not enter the tax formulas for other commodities...” (p. 92). Later,
7The assumption that xji ’s and y
j are publicly observable implies that the government will have no
difficulty in levying non-linear taxes. Indeed, the tax imposed on a given commodity can even depend
on the purchaser’s consumption of other commodities as well as on his income.
8Of course, same formula does not mean same level.
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Dixit (1985) referred to Sandmo’s result as an instance of the more general “principle of
targeting”. As he put it, this principle states that “a distortion is best countered ... by
a tax instrument that acts directly on the relevant margin.” (p. 314). Bovenberg and
van der Ploeg (1994) emphasize this principle in their finding, again assuming linear
taxes, that the formula for the labor income tax must also remain unaffected. While
our result here is in accordance with this property, we will see in subsequent sections
that this may not always be the case.
Finally, for the purpose of later comparisons, consider the famous “no distortion at
the top” result of the optimal tax theory. [See, e.g., Mirrlees (1971) and Seade (1977)].
This result continues to hold here. To see this, assume there exists a category of per-
sons, h, whom nobody mimics at equilibrium.9This is the counterpart in our multi-
characteristic setting to the “top” individual in standard optimal income tax models.
No incentive constraint is thus binding towards this category, so that λkh = 0 for all
k(6= h). It then immediately follows from (10b)—(10c) that no distortionary taxes must
be levied on these persons’ income and consumption of private goods. Moreover, from
(10a), they should face a simple Pigouvian tax on their consumption of y. The intuition
is just as in the traditional case. Since at equilibrium nobody wants to mimic an h-type
person, there is no advantage in distorting such a person’s consumption bundle from
the first-best.
3.3.1 Separable preferences and homogeneous tastes
An interesting case arises when individuals of different types have identical marginal
rates of substitution between any given two consumer goods (at the same consumption
bundle). That is, assume the following conditions hold everywhere.
ukjy
ukji
=
ujy
uji
j = 1, 2, . . . ,H, and i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (12a)
9When individuals differ in both earning abilities and tastes, this category may or may not exist.
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ukjs
ukji
=
ujs
uji
i, s = 1, 2, . . . , n. (12b)
Conditions (12a)—(12b) are guaranteed when (i) preferences are separable between labor
supply and other goods (as in Atkinson and Stiglitz) and (ii) tastes are homogeneous
in the sense that the marginal rates of substitution of different persons (for non-leisure
goods) are independent of the taste parameter θj .10 Given (12a)—(12b), one can easily
show that equations (10a)—(10b) will reduce to (11a)—(11b). This implies that the
structure of commodity taxes that implement the second-best allocations characterized
by (10a)—(10c) remains precisely the same as that in the first-best. That is, there should
be no taxes on xji ’s but that all types must face the same Pigouvian tax on y
j . [These
preferences have no implications for the structure of income taxes].
This result is reminiscent of Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) seminal result, and its
generalization by Mirrlees (1976), concerning the usefulness of commodity taxes in the
presence of a general income tax. In the absence of externality, when conditions (12a)—
(12b) hold, commodity taxes are not needed because they cannot be used as a basis
for separation between individuals of different types. [See Stiglitz (1982, 1987)]. That
is, they cannot be used to relax otherwise binding self-selection constraints and effect
a Pareto improvement. The same intuition applies to our setting when there is an
externality present. Consumption of private goods must not be distorted, and the only
adjustment needed for the externality generating good is the familiar Pigouvian one.
When conditions (12a)—(12b) do not hold, the second-best tax on y departs from the
Pigouvian tax and differs across types. The precise characterization of such departures
for all individual types is an interesting but complicated question. The next subsection
attempts to shed some light on this issue by considering a special case.
10Preferences satisfying these properties are represented by
U(x, y, L, θj) = Ω
¡
θjF (x, y), L
¢
.
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) assume identical preferences at the outset. Mirrlees (1976) discusses taste
differentiation.
12
3.3.2 A two-group illustration
Assume there are two types of skills and two types of tastes. Each skill level is as-
sociated with a particular taste parameter so that there will be only two types of
persons.11Individuals indexed by l are less skilled earning a lower wage than those
indexed by h. Further assume that preferences are separable in x, y and L. Specifically,
assume
uj(x, y, I) = f(x) + θjh(y) + ϕ(
I
wj
). (13)
Consider the Pareto-efficient allocations at which only the downward self-selection con-
straint is binding.12 This is when redistribution is from the high- to low-ability persons.
Setting λhl > 0 and λlh = 0 in (10b), it immediately follows that
uhs
uhi
=
uls
uli
= 1. (14)
This tells us that the tax rates on xji ’s (j = h, l) must be uniform. This result is not
surprising in light of our result in Subsection 3.3.1 and the structure of preferences
(separability in L and other goods and the uniformity of tastes for x). Given one extra
degree of freedom in setting the tax rates for every individual, this tax can then be set
at zero.
Turning to the taxation of y, from (10a), one has: uhy/uhi = 1+φ
0/μ. This indicates
a Pigouvian tax for the h-type. On the other hand, (10a) also yields
uly
uli
= 1 +
φ0
μ
+
λhlh0(yl)
μπl
(θh − θl), (15)
which immediately implies
uly
uli
> 1 +
φ0
μ
, if θl < θh, (16a)
uly
uli
< 1 +
φ0
μ
, if θl > θh. (16b)
11Without this assumption, there can be as many as four individual types.
12As in footnote 8 above, with multi-dimensional heterogeneity, such a regime may or may not exist.
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Equations (16a)—(16b) show that l-type persons must face a tax on their consumption
of y that may be greater as well as smaller than the Pigouvian tax. The intuition behind
these equations must be seen in the ability of the government to use commodity taxes to
relax an otherwise binding self-selection constraint. In either case, the idea is to make
the l-type’s bundle less appealing to an h-type, making the h-type more reluctant to
want to mimic the l-type. For example, if θh > θl, the (mimicking) h-type values y
more than the l-type. The tax on y will then affect the rich more than the poor.
The following proposition summarizes the main results of this section.
Proposition 1 Assume personal consumption levels are publicly observable. Then
(i) if individuals of different types have identical marginal rates of substitution (at
any given consumption bundle), (a) the optimal second-best tax on the externality gen-
erating good, y, is Pigouvian (and thus the same for everyone), and (b) private goods
must not be taxed;
(ii) with non-identical marginal rates of substitution, the optimal second-best tax on
y is nonlinear with a formula that contains both Pigouvian and non-Pigouvian terms;
(iii) the presence of the externality does not affect the formulas determining optimal
commodity taxes on private goods and optimal income taxes;
(iv) with two types of persons, preferences that are represented by (13), λhl > 0 and
λlh = 0, (a) high-ability persons should face a Pigouvian tax on their consumption of
y, while low-ability persons must face a tax greater (smaller) than Pigouvian if they, in
comparison to h-types and for the same consumption bundle, have a “lower” (“higher”)
marginal rate of substitution of y for xi, and (b) private goods must go untaxed.
4 Observable aggregate purchases
The results of the previous section rests crucially on the assumption that personal
consumption levels are publicly observable. This assumption allows the government to
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levy non-linear commodity taxes. Moreover, as we saw in Section 3, such taxes are in
fact necessary to implement Pareto-efficient allocations (constrained by self-selection).
However, this assumption is rather hard to justify on informational grounds. It is
more realistic to assume that the tax administration has information on anonymous
transactions (i.e. aggregate sales of a commodity rather than who purchases how much).
This is the standard assumption in the literature, so much so that it has been used as
part of very definition of indirect taxes. [See, e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 427)].
Under this circumstance, non-linear commodity taxes are not feasible. If , for instance,
the tax rate is linked to the quantity purchases, the buyer can avoid higher taxes by
splitting the transactions. As a rule, only linear commodity taxes are available.
It should be pointed out that the informational requirement for non-linear commod-
ity taxation is much more stringent than for non-linear income taxation. The latter type
of taxes require information on each person’s aggregate expenditure (or equivalently in-
come) only. Non-linear commodity taxes, on the other hand, require information on each
person’s expenditure on every single good. The linearity of commodity taxes is thus a
direct implication of the informational structure typically available in the economy.
Given this informational structure, one may proceed to characterize Pareto-efficient
allocations that are constrained, in addition to resource balance, not only by the stan-
dard self-selection constraints but also by the linearity of commodity taxes. To do this,
we derive an optimal revelation mechanism. For our purpose, a mechanism consists of
a set of type-specific before-tax incomes, Ij ’s, aggregate expenditures on private goods,
cj ’s, and a vector of commodity tax rates (same for everyone). This procedure deter-
mines the commodity tax rates, t = (t1, t2, . . . , tn) and ty, right from the outset. A
complete solution to the optimal tax problem per-se then requires only the design of
a general income tax function. Note that instead of commodity taxes, the mechanism
may equivalently specify the consumer prices of x and y, denoted by p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn)
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and q, where pi = 1 + ti (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and q = 1 + ty.13
To proceed further, it is necessary to consider the optimization problem of an in-
dividual for a given mechanism (p, q, c, I). This is necessitated by the fact that the
mechanism determines personal consumption levels (on private goods) only indirectly,
namely through prices. The mechanism assigns (p, q, cj , Ij) to an individual who reports
type j. The consumer then allocates cj between the produced goods, x and y.
Formally, given any vector (p, q, c, I), an individual of type j solves
max
x,y
uj(x, y, I) (17a)
subject to
nX
i=1
pixi + qy = c. (17b)
The resulting demand functions are denoted by xji (p, q, c, I) and y
j(p, q, c, I), and the
indirect utility function by
vj(p, q, c, I) ≡ uj
³
xj(p, q, c, I), yj(p, q, c, I), I
´
.
For ease of notation, we define
xji = x
j
i (p, q, c
j , Ij), (18a)
yj = yj(p, q, cj , Ij), (18b)
vj = vj(p, q, cj , Ij), (18c)
xjki = x
j
i (p, q, c
k, Ik), (18d)
yjk = yj(p, q, ck, Ik), (18e)
vjk = vj(p, q, ck, Ik), (18f)
V j = vj − φ
³X
j
πjyj
´
. (18g)
13Strictly speaking, this procedure does not characterize “allocations” as such; the optimization is
over a mix of quantities and prices. However, given the commodity prices, utility maximizing individuals
would choose the quantities themselves. We can thus think of the procedure as indirectly determining
the final allocations.
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4.1 Pareto-efficient (constrained) allocations
Constrained Pareto-efficient “allocations” can be described as follows. Maximize
X
j
γjV j , (19)
with respect to p2, p3, . . . , pn, q, cj and Ij ;14 subject to the resource constraintX
j
πj
h
(Ij − cj) +
nX
s=2
(ps − 1)xjs + (q − 1)yj
i
≥ R¯, (20)
and the self-selection constraints
vj ≥ vjk, j, k = 1, 2, . . . ,H. (21)
As in Section 3, denote the Lagrangian expression by L, and the Lagrangian mul-
tipliers associated with the resource constraint (20) by μ, and with the self-selection
constraints (21) by λjk. We have
L =
X
j
γjV j + μ
nX
j
πj
h
(Ij − cj) +
nX
s=2
(ps − 1)xjs + (q − 1)yj
i
− R¯
o
+
X
j
X
k 6=j
λjk(vj − vjk). (22)
Substituting for V j from (18g) into (22) and rearranging the terms, one may usefully
rewrite the Lagrangian expression as
L =
X
j
³
γj +
X
k 6=j
λjk
´
vj − φ
³X
j
πjyj
´
+ μ
nX
j
πj
h
(Ij − cj)
+
nX
s=2
(ps − 1)xjs + (q − 1)yj
i
− R¯
o
−
X
j
X
k 6=j
λjkvjk. (23)
The first-order conditions are:
∂L
∂Ij
=
³
γj +
X
k 6=j
λjk
´
vjI − πj
∂yj
∂Ij
φ0 + μπj
h
1 +
nX
s=2
(ps − 1)
∂xjs
∂Ij
14With one extra degree of freedom in setting commodity tax rates, t1 is set equal to zero so that
p1 = 1.
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+ (q − 1)∂y
j
∂Ij
i
−
X
k 6=j
λkjvkjI = 0, j, k = 1, 2, . . . ,H, (24a)
∂L
∂cj
=
³
γj +
X
k 6=j
λjk
´
vjc − πj
∂yj
∂cj
φ0 + μπj
h
− 1 +
nX
s=2
(ps − 1)
∂xjs
∂cj
+ (q − 1)∂y
j
∂cj
i
−
X
k 6=j
λkjvkjc = 0, (24b)
∂L
∂pi
=
X
j
³
γj +
X
k 6=j
λjk
´
vji −
³X
j
πj
∂yj
∂pi
´
φ0 + μ
X
j
πj
h nX
s=2
(ps − 1)
∂xjs
∂pi
+ xji + (q − 1)
∂yj
∂pi
i
−
X
j
X
k 6=j
λjkvjki = 0, i = 2, . . . , n, (24c)
∂L
∂q
=
X
j
³
γj +
X
k 6=j
λjk
´
vjq −
³X
j
πj
∂yj
∂q
´
φ0 + μ
X
j
πj
h nX
s=2
(ps − 1)
∂xjs
∂q
+ yj + (q − 1)∂y
j
∂q
i
−
X
j
X
k 6=j
λjkvjkq = 0, (24d)
where a subscript on v denotes a partial derivative. Equations (24a)—(24d) characterize
the Pareto-efficient allocations constrained both by self-selection as well as the linearity
of commodity tax rates. The next two sections discuss the properties of the commodity
tax rates and the general income tax function that can implement these allocations.
5 Optimal commodity taxes
Denote the compensated demand for a good by a “tilde” over the corresponding variable.
In the Appendix, we prove that an interior solution satisfies the following conditions.
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ty
t2
t3
...
tn
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
= A−1
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−PjPk 6=j λkj(ykj − yj)vkjcμ
−PjPk 6=j λkj(xkj2 − xj2)vkjcμ
−PjPk 6=j λkj(xkj3 − xj3)vkjcμ
...
−PjPk 6=j λkj(xkjn − xjn)vkjcμ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
0
0
...
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
φ0
μ
, (25)
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where
A =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
P
j π
j ∂y˜j
∂q
P
j π
j ∂y˜j
∂p2
P
j π
j ∂y˜j
∂p3 · · ·
P
j π
j ∂y˜j
∂pnP
j π
j ∂x˜
j
2
∂q
P
j π
j ∂x˜
j
2
∂p2
P
j π
j ∂x˜
j
2
∂p3 · · ·
P
j π
j ∂x˜
j
2
∂pn
...
...
. . .
...P
j π
j ∂x˜jn
∂q
P
j π
j ∂x˜jn
∂p2
P
j π
j ∂x˜jn
∂p3 · · ·
P
j π
j ∂x˜jn
∂pn
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (26)
Note that the right-hand side of (25) also depends on the tax rates so that we only
have an implicit “solution” here. Nevertheless (25) is illuminating in a number of
ways. First, it shows that the optimal tax on y is not in general strictly Pigouvian.
Again, given that the optimal tax rates on private goods are non-zero, this is to be
expected. Second, the formula characterizing the tax on y contains both Pigouvian
and non-Pigouvian elements. The non-Pigouvian part reflects the binding self-selection
constraints. Similar expressions appear in the characterization of optimal tax rates on
private goods. Third, the formulas for taxation of xji ’s and y
j ’s differ only in that the
latter entails a Pigouvian term. Thus Sandmo’s (1975) additivity property continues to
hold in our setting for commodity taxes.15
Separable preferences and homogeneous tastes: Subsection 3.3.1, and Propo-
sition 1, establish that if preferences are such that individuals of different types have
identical marginal rates of substitution between every two consumer goods, then pri-
vate goods should not be taxed and the tax on the externality generating good must be
Pigouvian. While the result was formally derived for observable personal consumption
levels, it continues to hold when the available information is on aggregate (as opposed
to personal) consumption levels so that the available commodity tax instruments are
linear. The point is that if nonlinear commodity taxes are not useful, linear commodity
taxes cannot be either. Examination of (25) bears this out. Under this circumstance,
from problem (17a)—(17b), ykj = yj and xkjs = xjs for all types k and j, and all goods s.
15The system of equations in (25) also yield first-best taxes. Setting λjk = 0 in these equations
immediately result in ti’s=0 and ty = φ0/μ.
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One can easily see that, given these equalities, ti’s=0 and ty = φ0/μ will be a solution
to (25).
5.1 Independent demands
To gain further insights into the structure of optimal taxes we next concentrate on the
special case where there are no cross-price and income effects. It is easy to see from
(25) that one will now have
ty =
P
j
P
k 6=j λkj(ykj − yj)vkjc /μ
−Pj πj∂y˜j/∂q + φ
0
μ
, (27a)
ti =
P
j
P
k 6=j λkj(x
kj
i − x
j
i )v
kj
c /μ
−Pj πj∂x˜ji/∂pi , i = 2, 3, . . . , n. (27b)
The formulas are strikingly simple, indicating a Pigouvian adjustment for ty in com-
parison to ti (i = 2, 3, . . . , n). One may thus loosely say, “everything else equal”, ty
will exceed ti by the Pigouvian element. Note also that the non-Pigouvian element of
ty and the tax on ti are identical in form. The denominators in these expressions can
be written in terms of elasticities. They will then yield a generalization of the famous
“inverse elasticity” rule in a setting with heterogeneous tastes and in the presence of a
general income tax. These considerations apply both to ty and ti
It is also interesting to note that the non-Pigouvian element of ty can take both
positive as well as negative values so that ty can be greater as well as smaller than
the Pigouvian tax. To see this, note that from the properties of the Slutsky matrix,
the denominator of the non-Pigouvian element is positive. It then follows that the
optimal tax on y exceeds (is smaller than) the Pigouvian tax if
P
j
P
k 6=j(ykj−yj)vkjc /μ
is positive (negative). A sufficient condition for this is that every mimicker, for whom
the incentive compatibility constraint binds, would have a higher (lower) demand for y
than the type whom he mimics. This makes quite a bit of sense, as the tax would then
hurt a mimicker more (less) in comparison to the person he mimics. Of course, the cited
condition is only sufficient. Less stringent conditions may also do.
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5.2 Uniform tax rates
While optimal commodity tax rates are generally non-uniform, as a practical policy
matter, almost all countries continue to levy indirect taxes that are, to a large extent,
uniform. Often, this is motivated by political economy considerations.16Whatever the
cause, if this is the case, one must impose the uniformity as an additional constraint on
the optimal tax problem of the government. The properties of the optimal tax rate on
the externality generating good and the optimal income tax schedule will then have to
be studied in the light of all the constraints imposed. The results of this section enable
us to do this most easily. Imposing ti = 0 (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) as an additional constraint on
problem (19)—(21) does not change the structure of the remaining first-order conditions.
The optimal tax on ty will then be found by setting ti = 0 in (A11) in the Appendix.
The resulting formula for the optimal tax rate will then be seen to be identical to the
one given by equation (27a). Our discussion in subsection 5.1 thus also applies here.
The following proposition summarizes the main results of this section.
Proposition 2 Assume aggregate (but not personal) consumption levels are publicly
observable. Then
(i) the optimal (linear) tax rate on y is characterized by both Pigouvian and non-
Pigouvian elements; while the externality leaves the formulas for the optimal tax rates
on private goods unaffected. The optimal tax rates are characterized by (25)—(26).
(ii) Assume individuals of different types have identical marginal rates of substitu-
tion (at the same consumption bundle). Then (a) the optimal second-best tax on y is
Pigouvian, and (b) private goods must not be taxed.
(iii) Assume either income and cross-price effects are all zero, or that private goods
must be taxed uniformly. Further assume that every mimicker, for whom the incentive
16This reflects many considerations. Differentiating amongst goods, that have no apparent differing
characteristics, is open to criticisms on the basis of the principle of horizontal equity. Moreover, to
the extent that differentiation may call for higher taxes on “necessities,” its implementation may prove
politically unpopular.
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compatibility constraint is binding, has a higher (lower) demand for y than the type
whom he mimics. Then the optimal tax on y exceeds (is smaller than) the Pigouvian
tax.
6 Income tax structure
The last question for us to examine is to determine if the presence of externality affects
the structure of the optimal income tax schedule, and if yes, how. Denote the general
income tax schedule facing a j-type person by T (Ij) so that his net income is cj =
Ij − T (Ij). The individual thus sets −vjI/vjc = 1 − T 0(Ij) where we have assumed the
tax function is differentiable with T 0 denoting the marginal income tax rate.17Dividing
equation (24a) by (24b), we can then immediately deduce that
1− T 0(Ij) =
1 +
hPn
i=2
∂xji
∂Ij ti +
∂yj
∂Ij ty
i
− φ0μ
∂yj
∂Ij −
P
k 6=j λ
kjvkjI
μπj
1−
hPn
i=2
∂xji
∂cj ti +
∂yj
∂cj ty
i
+ φ
0
μ
∂yj
∂cj +
P
k 6=j λ
kjvkjc
μπj
, (28)
Equation (28) indicates that the marginal income tax rate is determined by three
factors: incentive constraints, impacts of commodity taxes and the externality. The
presence of the externality terms in (28) is quite telling. It shows that, with unobservable
personal consumption levels, externality affects the shape of the income tax schedule.
In particular, note that for the marginal income tax rate to be independent of the
externality, one must set ty = φ0/μ. This, however, will be the case if conditions (12a)—
(12b) hold.
This result is in sharp contrast to the corresponding result in Section 3 where, with
observable consumption levels, we found that externality did not affect the expressions
for the marginal income tax rate. The intuition is simple. If yj ’s are publicly observable,
one can “directly” set them at the desired level (using a non-linear tax schedule to
17With a discrete distribution of types, the implementing tax function will generally be non-
differentiable at some points. There, we follow the standard terminology and continue to refer to
T 0(Ij) ≡ 1 + vjI/vjc as the marginal income tax rate; see Stiglitz (1987).
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implement this level). The income tax instrument is not needed for this purpose. On
the other hand, if yj ’s are not publicly observable, they are “controlled” only indirectly.
The income tax may then be used, in addition to the linear commodity tax on y, for
this purpose. Specifically, the income tax affects yj ’s and consequently this effect has
to be taken into account in the design of the optimal income tax. (Any impact from
income taxes on yj ’s, when yj ’s are observable, can be “neutralized” at no cost).
The foregoing result shows that Sandmo’s additivity property, and Dixit’s principle
of targeting, does not hold in this setting. The reason for this is that the available direct
instrument is more restrictive than the indirect instrument (a linear tax on the exter-
nality versus a nonlinear income tax). This is why in Section 3, where both instruments
were nonlinear, the indirect instrument was not found useful. The same intuition applies
to the findings of Sandmo (1975) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) where all
tax instruments (income as well as commodity) are linear and thus equally restrictive.
Equation (28) also sheds light on the direction of the impacts of externality and
indirect tax terms on the marginal income tax rate. One can easily see that the normality
of y (so that ∂yj/∂cj > 0) and its complementarity to labor supply (so that ∂yj/∂Ij > 0)
tend to lower T 0, if ty > φ0/μ; and to increase it, if ty < φ0/μ. Similarly, the normality
of xi (∂x
j
i/∂c
j > 0) and its complementarity to labor supply (∂xji/∂I
j > 0) tend to
lower T 0, if ti > 0; and to increase it, if ti < 0. These implications will be reversed when
the goods are inferior and/or substitutes to labor supply.
To derive a more precise characterization of the optimal income tax schedule, assume,
as in Subsection 3.3, that there exists a category of persons, h, whom nobody mimics at
equilibrium. This implies that no incentive constraint is binding towards this category,
so that λkh = 0 for all k(6= h). It will then immediately follow from (28) that
1− T 0(Ih) =
1 +
hPn
i=2
∂xhi
∂Ih ti +
∂yh
∂Ih ty
i
− φ0μ
∂yh
∂Ih
1−
hPn
i=2
∂xhi
∂ch ti +
∂yh
∂ch ty
i
+ φ
0
μ
∂yh
∂ch
. (29)
Now, as was shown in Subsection 5, if preferences are separable and tastes are homo-
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geneous, ti’s=0 and ty = φ0/μ, so that T 0(h) = 0. However, in the absence of such
restrictions on preferences, it is clear from (29) that in general
T 0(h) 6= 0.
That is, the well-known “no distortion at the top” result no longer holds. However, it
must be emphasized that the distortion does not arise because of the standard incentive
constraints [equations (21)]. Its source is the “incomplete control” of consumption levels
through linear commodity taxes (which arises because individual consumption levels are
not observable). The point is that changes in net and gross income (labor supply) affect
consumption levels. In turn, these changes affect welfare through tax revenues generated
from commodity taxes and through the externality.
The marginal income tax rates of all other groups (l 6= h), for whom some λkl > 0,
is found by substituting l for j in equation (28). The difference with h-group is that the
marginal income tax rate facing l-types will also be affected by the incentive constraints.
To shed more light on the properties of the marginal income tax rate, we consider the
following special case.
6.1 Uniform commodity tax rates
With the uniformity of tax rates as an additional constraint, the marginal income tax
rate is given by
1− T 0(Ij) =
1 +
³
ty − φ
0
μ
´
∂yj
∂Ij −
P
k 6=j λ
kjvkjI
μπj
1−
³
ty − φ
0
μ
´
∂yj
∂cj +
P
k 6=j λ
kjvkjc
μπj
. (30)
This can be derived either directly or more simply by setting ti = 0 in (28).
Again differentiate between two groups of types: h whom in equilibrium no person
mimics and l whom at least one type wants to mimic. For h the incentive terms vanish.
One can then see that the sign of T 0(Ih) is identical to the sign of
−
³
ty −
φ0
μ
´³∂yh
∂Ih
+
∂yh
∂ch
´
.
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Consequently, T 0(Ih) continues to be generally different from zero. Moreover, it may
even be possible to sign T 0(Ih). This depends on sign of ty − φ0/μ, which may be
determined from (27a) and part (iii) of Proposition 2. It also depends on the sign of
∂yh/∂Ih + ∂yh/∂ch. This latter term can be negative as well as positive. A sufficient
condition for the former is for y to be an inferior good (∂yh/∂ch < 0) as well as a
“substitute” to labor supply for h-type persons (∂yh/∂Ih < 0). On the other hand,
a sufficient condition for ∂yh/∂Ih + ∂yh/∂ch to be positive is that y is a normal good
(∂yh/∂ch > 0) and a “complement” to labor supply for h-type persons (∂yh/∂Ih > 0).
The above factors continue to play the same role in determining the sign and the
size of the marginal income tax rate facing l-types. However, for these persons, there
will also be additional effects due to the incentive constraints along the familiar lines.
The following proposition summarizes the main results of this section.
Proposition 3 Assume aggregate (but not personal) consumption levels are publicly
observable. Then
(i) in the absence of other restrictions, the externality affects the income tax struc-
ture;
(ii) the externality does not affect the income tax structure, if individuals of different
types have identical marginal rates of substitution (at the same consumption bundle);
(iii) marginal income tax rate “at the top” will generally be nonzero; both positive
and negative values are possible.
7 Conclusion
This paper has re-examined the Pigouvian prescription for correcting externalities in
a second-best environment. It has also examined the properties of optimal commodity
and income taxes in the presence of externalities. It has shown that the answers to
these questions depend crucially on the structure of information in the economy, via its
determining the type of tax instruments that are available to the government.
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Four main conclusions have emerged. First, environmental levies must generally
consist of Pigouvian and non-Pigouvian terms and be nonlinear (if permitted by the
informational structure). Second, externalities do not affect commodity tax formulas
for private goods. This holds regardless of the public observability of individual con-
sumption levels and thus applies to both linear and nonlinear commodity taxes. Third,
externalities do not affect the income tax structure if commodity taxes are nonlinear
and affect it if commodity taxes are linear. Fourth, a general income tax plus strictly
Pigouvian taxes are sufficient for efficient taxation if individuals of different types have
identical marginal rates of substitution (at any given consumption bundle).
An important implication of our second and third conclusions is that Sandmo’s
additivity property, and Dixit’s Principle of targeting, breaks down when the tax in-
struments consist of linear commodity and nonlinear income taxes. In this case, while
the tax formulas for private goods remain unaffected, income tax formulas change. The
reason for this is that the available direct instrument is more restrictive than the (af-
fected) indirect instrument (a linear tax on the externality versus a nonlinear income
tax).
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Appendix
Derivation of (25): Multiply equation (24b) by yj , sum over j, add the resulting
equation to (24d), and simplify. Then multiply (24b) by xji (i = 2, 3, . . . , n), sum over
j, add the resulting equation to (24c), and simplify. The following system of equation
results
X
j
³
γj +
X
k 6=j
λjk
´³
vjq + y
jvjc
´
− φ0
X
j
πj
³
yj
∂yj
∂cj
+
∂yj
∂q
´
+ μ
X
j
πj
h nX
s=2
(ps − 1)
³
yj
∂xjs
∂cj
+
∂xji
∂q
´
+ (q − 1)
³
yj
∂yj
∂cj
+
∂yj
∂q
´i
−
X
j
X
k 6=j
λkj
³
vkjq + y
jvkjc ) = 0, (A1)
X
j
³
γj +
X
k 6=j
λjk
´³
vji + x
j
iv
j
c
´
− φ0
X
j
πj
³
xji
∂yj
∂cj
+
∂yj
∂pi
´
+ μ
X
j
πj
h nX
s=2
(ps − 1)
³
xji
∂xjs
∂cj
+
∂xjs
∂pi
´
+ (q − 1)
³
xji
∂yj
∂cj
+
∂yj
∂pi
´i
−
X
j
X
k 6=j
λkj
³
vkji + x
j
iv
kj
c ) = 0, i = 2, 3, . . . , n. (A2)
Next make use of Roy’s identity to set:
vjq + y
jvjc = 0, (A3)
vkjq + y
kjvkjc = 0, (A4)
vji + x
j
iv
j
c = 0, (A5)
vkji + x
kj
i v
kj
c = 0, (A6)
and the Slutsky equation to write:
∂yj
∂q
=
∂y˜j
∂q
− yj ∂y
j
∂cj
, (A7)
∂xjs
∂q
=
∂x˜js
∂q
− yj ∂x
j
s
∂cj
, (A8)
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∂yj
∂pi
=
∂y˜j
∂pi
− xji
∂yj
∂cj
, (A9)
∂xjs
∂pi
=
∂x˜js
∂pi
− xji
∂xjs
∂cj
. (A10)
Substituting from equations (A3)—(A6) and (A7)—(A10) in (A1)—(A2), making use of
the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix, setting pi − 1 = ti and q − 1 = ty, upon further
simplification and rearrangement, one arrives at
³X
j
πj
∂y˜j
∂q
´
ty +
nX
i=2
³X
j
πj
∂y˜j
∂pi
´
ti =
−
X
j
X
k 6=j
λkj
³
ykj − yj)v
kj
c
μ
+
³X
j
πj
∂y˜j
∂q
´φ0
μ
, (A11)
³X
j
πj
∂x˜js
∂q
´
ty +
nX
i=2
³X
j
πj
∂x˜js
∂pi
´
ti =
−
X
j
X
k 6=j
λkj
³
xkjs − xjs)
vkjc
μ
+
³X
j
πj
∂x˜js
∂q
´φ0
μ
, s = 2, . . . , n, (A12)
Equations (A11)—(A12) are one way of characterizing the optimal commodity tax rates:
ti’s and ty.
To arrive at (25), use the definition of A in (26) to write out equations (A11)— (A12)
in matrix notation:
A
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ty
t2
t3
...
tn
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−PjPk 6=j λkj³ykj − yj)vkjcμ + ³Pj πj ∂y˜j∂q ´φ0μ
−PjPk 6=j λkj³xkj2 − xj2)vkjcμ + ³Pj πj ∂x˜j2∂q ´φ0μ
−PjPk 6=j λkj³xkj3 − xj3)vkjcμ + ³Pj πj ∂x˜j3∂q ´φ0μ
...
−PjPk 6=j λkj³xkjn − xjn)vkjcμ + ³Pj πj ∂x˜jn∂q ´φ0μ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (A13)
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Denote the first column vector of A by a1. Premultiplying (A13) by A
−1 then yields
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ty
t2
t3
...
tn
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
= A−1
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−PjPk 6=j λkj³ykj − yj)vkjcμ
−PjPk 6=j λkj³xkj2 − xj2)vkjcμ
−PjPk 6=j λkj³xkj3 − xj3)vkjcμ
...
−PjPk 6=j λkj³xkjn − xjn)vkjcμ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+ (A−1a1)
φ0
μ
, (A14)
which is readily seen to be the system of equations (25) in the text.
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